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Abstract  
Smartphones are increasingly pervasive in users’ everyday lives. Security concerns of data 
compromises are growing, and explicit authentication methods such as passwords are proving to 
be inconvenient and inadequate. To address this, behavioral authentication approaches have 
been proposed wherein a user is authenticated continuously and implicitly, by utilizing 
consistent patterns in their behavior. This research project develops a Behavioral Model System 
(BMS) that records users’ behavioral metrics on an Android device and sends them to a server to 
develop a behavioral model for the user. Once a strong model is generated using deep learning, 
a user’s most recent behavior is queried against the model to authenticate them, 2 out of 4 test 
subjects had unique behaviors that identified them.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Authentication Methods 
 Authentication is the process by which a system verifies the identity of a user to allow 
access to it [1]. Authorization refers to the permissions and rules that determine the access that 
a user has [1]. On a college campus or at a workplace, an identification badge may authenticate a 
person, but it does not necessarily authorize him or her to access every building.  These two 
concepts pertain to allowing access and the level of access granted to aspects of a secured system; 
however, both are central to the design of a security system. In a simple, single user system, these 
concepts have a one-to-one relationship. If a user’s credentials are accepted by the system they 
are said to be “authenticated” and “authorized”, otherwise they are both “unauthenticated” and 
“unauthorized”. For the sake of this research, we assumed that authentication and authorization 
have this one-to-one relationship such that an authenticated user is also authorized to access 
the system. The process of authentication can be placed into two of four general subcategories 
based on both temporal attributes and authentication schemes. In time-based categories, 
authentication can either be Continuous or Episodic, while in scheme, authentication can either 
be Explicit or Implicit. 
Definitions:  
1. Continuous authentication: The process in which a system will constantly 
attempt to verify the identity of a user using a specific scheme [2].  
2. Episodic authentication: The process in which a system will attempt to verify the 
identity of a user when the user’s authorization status expires or is needed to 
perform a specific action [3]. 
3. Explicit authentication: The process in which a system will request users to 
specifically present credentials, to verify the identity of a user [4]. 
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4. Implicit authentication: The process in which a system will verify a user through 
their behavior or actions [5]. 
 
 Episodic authentication proves to be less computationally demanding in comparison to   
continuous authentication. However, Continuous authentication is inherently more secure as it 
authenticates in the same way as Episodic authentication, but runs more frequently. Explicit 
authentication is simpler to implement than Implicit authentication, as implicit requires 
significant research and overhead to program a device to understand how to distinguish between 
and authenticate the correct user. In theory, Implicit authentication is more secure than Explicit 
authentication as it offers more opportunities for authentication and is more difficult to spoof 
or replicate a person’s behaviors and actions, rather than some sort of passcode [6]. 
Many systems used today follow the Episodic and Explicit authentication paradigm, 
usually implementing passwords, pins, and fingerprints. For instance, a website with personal 
information will generally ask for a username and password at the beginning, a smartphone 
might ask for a fingerprint, a campus might use a badging system to let personnel into a building 
and into specific rooms, and an important document might require a signature. Despite the 
intrigue and research opportunities of Implicit authentication, those approaches usually are 
regarded as too difficult to be a means of authentication in professionally-designed systems [7]. 
 
1.2. Importance of the Modern Smartphone  
 Over the past decade, smartphones have become ingrained into daily life, used for 
purposes ranging across gaming, social media, shopping, banking, email, and more. Estimates 
show that over two billion people were using smartphones worldwide by the end of 2016 [8]. 
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Smartphones have sensors for measuring the user’s environment and implicitly accumulate large 
volumes of personal data from frequent use - messages, pictures, documents, call logs, location 
traces, and usage logs. These data are unique to the user and can be viewed as their usage 
signature. Over the past few years, smartphone services have started to utilize this available data 
to improve functionality for the end user, for example, by remembering where you’ve parked 
your car.  
Data from smartphones is growing easier to access simultaneously with their users 
interacting with them more. According to a study conducted by Time magazine in 2015, people 
in the United States checked their phones 46 times a day. That number rose to 74 times a day 
among users from ages 18 – 24 [9].  The 2015 Internet Trends report estimates that the average 
adult spent 5.6 hours a day on the internet with 2.8 of those hours being on a mobile device [10]. 
As the user interacts more with and relies more on their smartphone the data it accumulates is 
increasingly personal and sensitive. The phone collects email data, internet search data, access 
to social media accounts, bank accounts, and so much more.   
1.3. Current Security Measures on Smartphones  
 Smartphones contain sensitive personal and non-personal data. Developers and 
researchers understand the personal nature of this locally-stored data, and have approached user 
authentication in a variety of ways. Table 1 lists some of the methods currently used to 
authenticate smartphones. 
Method  Description 
Pin  4 digit number the user enters to unlock the 
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phone [11]. 
Password A combination of letters, numbers, and 
symbols the user types in to unlock the phone 
[11]. 
Pattern  The user swipes a specific pattern to unlock 
their phone [11]. 
Pictures The user touches/swipes a picture in the 
correct place(s) to unlock the phone [12]. 
Fingerprint The user places one of their remembered 
fingers on the fingerprint scanner to unlock 
their phone [13, p. 0]. 
Iris The phone will scan the user’s eye to unlock 
the phone [14]. 
Trusted Devices The phone will check the proximity of a 
trusted device (ex. smartwatch) through the 
Bluetooth connection to unlock the phone 
[15]. 
Voice Recognition The phone recognizes the user’s voice to 
unlock the phone [15].  
NFC Tags The user taps a paired object with an NFC tag 
on the phone to unlock it [15]. 
Location Based The phone will automatically unlock if in a 
trusted location [15]. 
Table 1. Methods used to Authenticate Smartphones 
Many of the authentication methods in Table 1 are episodic, requesting for credentials 
after certain timeframes, and explicit, requiring the user’s direct inputs (typing in a password, 
holding their finger up to a fingerprint scanner). Several are used in conjunction with one 
another; for example, many phones with fingerprint scanners use a password or a pin as a backup 
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method if normal authentication fails, or in certain conditions specified by the user. Still in other 
situations, some authentication methods are not refined enough to be used as a key for 
encryption, and will require a backup authentication method to decrypt a file system, as with 
pattern and fingerprint unlocks on Android. Others can even authenticate in certain situations 
but use a backup otherwise, like how a location based authentication will unlock the phone 
automatically if the user is in a known location, but might switch to a different authentication 
method in an unknown location. Sadly, many of these compound methods are not particularly 
popular among users, even if these options are readily available and easily accessible [16]. 
1.3.1 The Concept of Trust 
 A more modern approach to authorization has been proposed in recent years, with the 
suggestion of a “trust score” to a user, where if a user can’t be completely authenticated, they 
are only authorized to do a limited range of things on the device [17]. For example, if a phone has 
a paired Bluetooth smartwatch that has a weak connection to the phone at the moment, it could 
trust that the user was near enough to the phone, but not completely certain that the user was 
the one using the device due to the distance of the watch implied by a weaker signal. In that case, 
the phone could require no further authentication for simple, general tasks like using a web 
browser, but would require additional authentication for using a banking app. Trust scores are 
an excellent application for our use, as it allowed us to compare the likelihood of a user 
performing along their usual behaviors against their current ones, available well enough to 
authenticate users on a spectrum as opposed to the two options of authenticated or 
unauthenticated. 
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1.4. Limitations of Current Security Methods 
Most password systems are not secure enough to protect the data that a smartphone 
holds, since they tend to trade off major security for convenience. Table 2 describes some of the 
major vulnerabilities of the above methods. 
 
Method  Description 
Pin  Generally short and can be easily stolen by an attacker observing the 
phone being unlocked. One study suggests that 15% of 4 digit pin 
lockscreens can unlocked in just ten tries [18]. Longer pins may be an 
option but they are generally easily forgettable. 
Password Password database leaks are far too common among large 
corporations holding them, and many people use the same password 
in multiple places, potentially compromising their accounts across 
several services with a compromise at the least secure of all the 
companies holding them. 
Pattern  Pattern lock screens are vulnerable to smudge attacks, where the oil 
residues of fingers make it possible for people or computers to trace 
the pattern and gain access [11].  
Pictures Also vulnerable to smudge attacks with swiping and drawing. It is also 
relatively easy to find the parts of a picture that one may touch. 
Fingerprint Fingerprint passwords are unchangeable and they are irreplaceable. 
It is also possible to fake fingerprint data by gathering information  
through photographs of the target’s hands [19]. Government 
fingerprint databases have also been breached [20]. 
Iris Iris passwords are unchangeable and irreplaceable. They have similar 
vulnerabilities to fingerprints.  
Trusted Devices An attacker could take the target’s phone and unlock it if they were 
near the target and their trusted device. 
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Voice Recognition Accuracy may lower if the user’s voice changes due to certain 
conditions such as being sick [21]. Passphrases can also be easily 
overheard. 
NFC Tags NFC tags can be stolen in the same way a smartphone can. 
Location-Based An attacker just needs to unlock the target’s phone in a specified 
location to gain access  
Table 2. Vulnerabilities of Current Smartphone Authentication Methods 
Many users tend to utilize security methods that are more convenient and easier to use. 
For many people, convenience is often more important than security, and once a hacker has 
gained access, none of these methods stop an attacker from stealing data from the smartphone 
after it has been unlocked. It becomes trivial for such an attacker to steal important information 
from a target’s unlocked smartphone. In general, users tend to remain logged in to multiple 
accounts on their phones. Attackers can easily access the target user’s social media accounts, 
email accounts, and other services.  
1.5 Behavioral Authentication 
 A notable new direction to assuage this problem is to take the limitations of explicit 
authentication and approach authentication through a new direction- user behavior. Behavioral 
authentication may solve many of the shortcomings of current smartphone authentication 
techniques. Conceptually, a behavioral authentication system can learn who a user is by 
understanding how they act and interact with their phone and requires no additional input from 
the user to authenticate him or her. In current techniques, an attacker would just need to acquire 
certain information to get into the system. Unlike current authentication techniques, it would be 
very difficult for an attacker to emulate a victim user exactly even if they were able to acquire 
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information on the victim [2]. Because behavior is implicit, it can be checked continuously 
without being an annoyance to the user as opposed to just when unlocking the phone [22].   
1.6 The Goal of This Project 
We aim to enhance smartphone security  by creating the beginnings of a low power, 
customizable, continuous behavioral model system (BMS)- a security system that authenticates 
users based on a variety of behavior patterns and unique phone interactions. Conversely, this 
system will also be able to de-authenticate a user, when it detects inconsistent or suspicious 
behavior. We envision that BMS: 
 Tracks the user’s behavior through a combination of metrics  selected for their ability 
to capture unique user behaviors around smartphone usage 
  Transmits the tracked data to a centralized server for storing data and training a 
model of the user using deep learning 
 Compares new behavioral user data against a trained model of the user and returns 
whether the user is authenticated or unauthenticated based on how well new behavior 
matches the known behavior 
The proposed system uses behavioral data gathered from the phone’s sensors to solve 
some of the problems associated with current password systems, namely the attacker stealing an 
unlocked phone from the actual user. Because the system continuously authenticates based on 
behavior, critical applications or the phone can be locked out if some of the tracked features 
change dramatically yielding a low trust score. 
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One major benefit of the proposed system is that it is convenient and easy to use. It can 
be used in combination with other authentication methods and it does not require  any additional 
steps from the user except to use their smartphone and behave like they normally do. However, 
a system that continuously runs in the background inherently has a higher energy cost than an 
episodic system. Regardless of the convenience of authentication and enhanced security, most 
people have an interest in maximizing the battery life in their smartphones and it would be a key 
concern for us to minimize battery drain [7].  
This system is also modular. The system can track as many behaviors as necessary to 
reliably authenticate the user. To keep the project’s scope manageable, BMS will initially be 
trained to only track a small number of specific behaviors.  However, as more behaviors that can 
be used for authentication are discovered, and evaluated, the proposed system can be modified 
to integrate them. Comparatively, BMS is more flexible than other password-based 
authentication systems.  
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2. Background 
2.1 Data Smartphones Collect 
 Smartphones have sensors collect usage data in several different forms. Usage logs amass 
information quickly, as phones collect data from applications, services, sensors, and more [23]. 
These logs can contain simple data such as SMS and call history, but also more complex 
information such as location, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi statistics. Although logs only generally 
contain the data that phones can passively collect, it is possible to actively obtain more data by 
utilizing the many different sensors smartphones contain and running services to collect such 
data.  
2.1.1 Hard Sensors 
Hard sensors are "physically-sensing devices" that sense environmental (e.g. light, 
temperature) or physical behaviors (e.g. motion, touch) of the user [24]. These collect data from 
smartphone hardware such as the accelerometer, GPS, and gyroscope. The following (Table 3) is 
a list of common smartphone hard sensors and what data they can collect [25].  
  
Hard Sensor What it Measures 
Accelerometer The acceleration force that is applied to a 
device in the x, y, and z axes. 
Gyroscope The phone’s rate of rotation about the x, y, 
and z axes. 
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Light  The ambient light surrounding the device. 
Magnetometer The Earth’s (and other) magnetic fields in the 
x, y, and z axes. 
Orientation The degrees of rotation that a device has made 
about all three axes. 
Barometer Measures the ambient air pressure around the 
device. 
Proximity Measures the proximity of an object relative to 
the distance of the screen. 
Pedometer Measures the number of steps taken by the 
user. 
Touch Measures length and width of strokes by the 
user on the touch screen.  
Temperature Measures room temperature 
Humidity Measures relative ambient humidity 
Table 3. Common Smartphone Hard Sensors[25] 
2.1.2 Soft Sensors 
Soft sensors are sensors that "record information of a phone's running status" [24]. These 
collect information from a phone's software. Some examples of soft sensors include screen 
on/off, app usage, messages, and phone calls. The following (Table 4) is a list of smartphone soft 
sensors analyzed by Rachuri et al [26]. 
Soft Sensor Features 
Battery charging? (boolean) 
Battery level {1,2,...100} 
Battery state {low, medium, high} 
Network type {Wi-Fi, cellular, none} 
Network name (string) 
Last app used category {app categories} 
# Proximity events 
17 
 
Table 4. Soft Sensor Features used by Rachuri et al [26]. 
2.1.3 Inferring User Activity 
Once sensor data is accumulated, smartphones can take the information saved in these 
logs and use them across applications that request sensor data. Using the data from these sensors 
and logs, it is possible for the phone to make inferences about the activities of a person. There 
are many examples in the literature of smartphone applications that detect when the user is 
awake and when they are sleeping, the walking gait of a user, and the mood of the user by using 
a combination of these sensors, which are described further below. 
Smartphone Inference of Alcohol Consumption Levels from Gait tracks and classifies 
smartphone accelerometer data to infer the user's level of intoxication [27]. Toss ‘N’ Turn: 
Smartphone as Sleep and Sleep Quality Detector analyzes accelerometer, microphone, ambient 
light, screen proximity, running process, battery state, and display screen state data to create 
models that predict when the user is sleeping and sleep quality [28].  
2.2 Doze: Android's Power Saving Mechanism 
 In order to reduce the energy consumption of the Android operating system has various 
energy-saving mechanisms and ways of interacting with data in real time.  Specifically, it’s 
common for when and how smartphone data can be used to be limited.  These limitations have 
been developed over time through improvements to Android’s power-saving functionality, to 
allow the phone to last throughout the day and for extend periods of non-use. Such 
# Screen events 
# SMS events 
# Phone calls 
Recent SMS/Calls? (boolean) 
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implementations are comprehensively referred to as ‘Doze’, since Android Marshmallow (6.0), 
and Doze On-the-Go, implemented since Android Nougat (7.0) [29].  Since Doze limits the 
frequency with which data can be retrieved on the client and sent to the BMS server in order to 
verify the user’s behavior as consistent and authentic, it is vital to understand how the Doze 
mechanism functions.  
 
2.2.1 Doze in Android 6.0 (Marshmallow) 
 Doze, a feature of modern versions of Android, forces wakelocks to be in sync with one 
another and less frequent. With Doze, the device needs to be in a relatively stationary position, 
like sitting in a nightstand or pocket at any given time to be enabled. When Doze is on, low-
priority apps, such as email notifications, are relegated to infrequent and low-power activity: 
they are forced to wait for their notifications, background updates, and more until the phone is 
active again or on a time scheduled by Doze [30]. Only high-priority applications, like apps that 
make and receive calls, send and receive text messages, and other apps flagged as high-priority 
through the Google Cloud Messaging service, can prompt a wakelock. As seen in Figure 1 below, 
apps are not allowed to access data except for the normal ‘maintenance windows’ available.  
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Figure 1. Wakelocks in Android with Doze (off, then turned on) [31]. 
2.2.2 Doze’s Expansion in Android 7.0 (Nougat) 
 In Android 7.0 (Nougat), a version of Android several of our development phones used for 
this project run, introduced even more considerations from Doze for development of our 
application. Doze was expanded with Google’s “Project Svelte”, where Doze limits broadcasts for 
mobile networks and Wi-Fi; apps will frequently ask for data updates with a 
CONNECTIVITY_ACTION change, and instead of them broadcasting for this when a connection 
is changed, app permissions are changed to the point to remove this, and also keep devices 
unable to receive information regarding a new picture or new video.  
2.2.3 Implications of the Doze Mechanism and Recent Changes 
 With these major Doze-related changes to how Android allows for scheduling and 
accessing data, our implementation is constrained to be less aggressive in triggering data 
collection events, as we have to wait for Android’s job scheduler to select an acceptable time for 
the BMS client to obtain data, rather than be collecting data on demand, like we had initially 
hoped for. We will instead have to consider how frequently   our smartphone client can poll 
sensor data, with the OS allowing our app to wake up and ask for high priority data. Additionally, 
it significantly limits how often we can communicate with a server, as wakelocks to send data are 
limited to the ‘maintenance windows’ that the operating system allows our application. With 
these considerations in place, the design of our project is different from that of many similar, 
past implementations of behavioral authentication, as we need to work around the restrictions 
Doze and other optimizations pose while maintaining a strong security model. We are limited by 
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the frequency at which the user’s smartphone can send or receive data from our authentication 
server.  
2.3. Deep Learning/Neural Networks 
In implementing an intelligence that can log activities and convert these gathered 
metrics to a conceptually understood behavior, we found Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to be 
our most viable option. ANNs are information processing systems that can be used to detect 
patterns in data and sort data.  ANNs are loosely modeled after the interconnected neurons in a 
mammalian brain structure [32]. Generally organized into 3 types of layers, ANNs include an 
input layer, one or more hidden layers, and an output layer. Each of these layers are made up of 
interconnected nodes which contain an activation function to fire. Generally, information or 
patterns are given to the input layer, the input layer then communicates to the hidden layer(s) 
to process the information, and the last hidden layer communicates to the output layer which 
then displays a result. An example neural network is shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. An example neural network [33] 
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ANN’s can vary wildly, with some neural networks better at some things that others. 
Below, Table 5 lists some types of neural networks and their uses, as described by The Asimov 
Institute [34]. 
Neural Network Type Uses 
Feed forward  Supervised learning, straight-forward 
correlations between input nodes. 
Convolutional Image classification, filtering image detail. 
Recurrent Processing events in a timeline, data given in 
a sequence. 
Support vector machines Classifying n-dimensional data. 
Kohonen networks Competitive learning to classify 
unsupervised data. 
Table 5. Some Common Neural Network Types [34] 
We used a feed forward neural network because of its ease of implementation and its 
ability to find correlations between the input and output. In training these distinct networks, 
there are two main approaches: supervised and unsupervised learning.  Supervised learning 
trains an ANN by giving it inputs as well as the correct output. If the system’s output is different 
from the desired output, the system will adjust its structure in order to better categorize results 
in the future a process to adjust itself so that it will be better at categorizing in the future. 
Unsupervised learning is when a network is given many unlabeled inputs and makes categories 
and classifications by looking at patterns in the data, no corrections are made since there is no 
desired output. After training, an ANN can process data and classify it based on the weights and 
biases of nodes learned during the training session. We plan to use a supervised approach since 
our training data will be labeled with the correct outputs. For instance, data collected from 
subject A can be labeled as "true" for subject A and "false" for all other subjects. 
Incremental learning is a technique used in supervised machine learning wherein the 
neural network is trained with each data point exactly once. It can be used in situations where 
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the data is generated or becomes gradually available over time, or when the size of the training 
data is too large to maintain all of it in a single repository. In our case of continuous 
authentication, data is being collected non-stop throughout the day. Since our authentication 
system must continuously incorporate this new data, we plan to use incremental learning. 
Further, with each data point used in training exactly once, not after the model has been used to 
predict and later train, data can be deleted immediately after training to simplify memory 
management. 
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3. Related Work 
Smartphones contain many sensors that can be used to track behaviors of the user. Many 
researchers have purposed these sensors in determining which combinations of behaviors 
positively identify a user, and evaluating the effectiveness of these sensors for that task. We have 
used these studies, discussed below, to build an understanding of prior work in the field. We drew 
inspiration from the behaviors that were tracked, prior findings regarding what behaviors were 
most accurate and robust: from the human studies conducted, the artificial intelligence models 
used, and their goals for future work upon conclusion of their research. The area of behavioral 
authentication is actively being researched and highly collaborative- many groups utilize one 
another’s studies to improve their own research, and make a more significant contribution to the 
field. Due to our limited time, we utilized the findings and results from other studies to make 
decisions such as sensor selection, so that we can focus on other, less-researched aspects. 
3.1 Comparative Research on Positive Identification 
 
Positive Identification, or research based on accurately determining that the user using 
the device is one that is authorized to work with it, is by far more difficult compared to negative 
authentication, which only has to have a stronger confidence that the identification is correct or 
not close enough to what is expected. In Lee et al. [24] they attempt to positively identify and 
distinguish users based on three sensors. They chose their three - magnetometer, accelerometer, 
and orientation, based on the diverse coverage of user and environmental information, along 
with the lack of user permissions required to track these sensors [24]. They acquired accuracies 
for unique combinations of the three sensors, and measured tradeoff between training time and 
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sampling rate. Further, they provided a comparison between their study and similar studies 
involving smartphone sensors; we examined this research compiled by Lee et al. in order to get 
a better understanding of metrics that worked for other groups [24]. Table 6 is a table of this 
research. We built off of these studies and, from the sensors listed, we incorporated two of these 
sensors, orientation and GPS. two of these sensors, orientation and GPS. 
 Devices Sensors Method Accurac
y 
Detectin
g Time 
Script 
Lee et al. Nexus 5, 
Android 
Orientation, 
Magnetometer, 
Accelerometer 
SVM 90.23% Train: 
6.07s 
Test: 20s 
No 
Kayacik et 
al., 2014 
Android Light, 
Orientation, 
Magnetometer, 
Accelerometer 
Temporal 
& Spatial 
model 
N/A Train: 
N/A 
Test: 
≥122s 
No 
Zhu et al. 
2013 
Nexus S Orientation, 
Magnetometer, 
Accelerometer 
N-gram 
language 
model 
71.3% N/A Yes 
Buthpitiya 
et. al., 2011 
N/A GPS N-gram 
model on 
location 
86.6% Train: 
N/A 
Test: 
≥122s 
No 
Trojahn et 
al., 2013 
HTC Desire screen Keystroke 
& 
handwriti
ng 
FP:11% 
FN:16% 
N/A Yes 
Li et al., 
2013 
Motorola 
Droid 
screen Sliding 
pattern 
95.7% Train: 
N/A 
Test: 
.648s 
Yes 
Nickel et al. 
2012 
Motorola 
Milestone 
accelerometer K-NN FP:3.97
% 
FN: 
Train: 
1.5min 
Test:30s 
Yes 
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22.22% 
Table 6. A Comparison of Sensors, Methods, and Accuracy for Identification/Authentication[24] 
 Another study, by Yampolskiy et al[35]. researched other behavioral metrics studies and 
showcased how single metrics were able to achieve a high detection rate while having a low false 
acceptance rate and false rejection rate. Below, Table 7 shows the various behavioral metrics 
which Yampolskiy compared. Although we do not be using the exact metrics they mentioned, 
their research has led us to believe that metrics such as App usage events will work well. 
 
Behavioral 
metric 
Publication Detection 
Rate 
FAR 
(Acceptance 
Rate) 
FRR 
(False 
Rejection 
Rate) 
EER 
(Equal Error 
Rate) 
Biometric 
Sketch 
Bromme and 
Al-Zubi 
(2003) 
   7.2% 
Blinking Westeyn and 
Starner 
(2004) 
82.02%    
Calling 
behavior 
Fawcett and 
Provost 
(1997) 
92.5%    
Car driving 
style 
Erdogan et al. 
(2005a) 
88.25%   4.0% 
Command 
line lexicon 
Marin et. al. 
(2001) 
74.4%  33.5%  
Credit card 
use 
Brause et al. 
(1999) 
99.995%  20%  
E-mail 
behavior 
Vel et al. 
(2001) 
90.5%    
Gait/stride Kale et al. 90%    
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(2004) 
Game 
strategy 
Yampolsky 
and 
Govindajaru 
(2007) 
   7.0% 
Handgrip Veldhuis et 
al. (2004) 
   1.8% 
Haptic Orozeo et al. 
(2006) 
 25%  22.3% 
Keystroke  Bergadano et 
al. (2002) 
 0.01%  4%  
Lip 
movement 
Mok et al. 
(2004) 
   2.17% 
Mouse 
dynamics 
Pusara and 
Brodley 
(2004) 
 0.43% 1.75%  
Programming 
Style 
Frantzeskou 
et al. (2004) 
73%    
Signature 
Handwriting 
(1) 
Jain et al. 
(2002) 
 1.6% 2.8%  
Signature 
Handwriting 
(2) 
Zhu et al. 
(2000) 
95.7%    
Tapping Henderson et 
al. (2001) 
   2.3% 
Text 
Authorship 
Halteren 
(2004) 
 0.2% 0.0%  
Voice/speech
/singing 
Colombi et al. 
(1996) 
   0.28% 
Voice/speech
/singing 
Tsai and 
Wang (2006) 
   29.6% 
Table 7. Recognition, verification, and error rates of behavioral metrics 
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3.2 Generalized Algorithm for Categorizing Behavioral Authentication  
Yampolskiy et al.[35] organizes behavioral biometrics into several categories. According to those 
authors, there are 5 types of Behavioral Biometrics. They are described in detail below: 
●  “Authorship based biometrics”:  Metrics, for example, that examine a piece of text or a 
drawing. For authentication, these algorithms look at the style peculiarities such as 
vocabulary, punctuation, and brush strokes.  
●  “Human Computer Interaction biometrics”: Metrics that consider human interaction 
with input devices; they are indicative of the specific skills, styles, and knowledge 
displayed while interacting with a computer.  
●  “Low level computer software action”: Metrics that read from system logs and activities 
indirectly generated by the second category.  
●  “Motor-skills for verification”: Metrics that look at muscle movements while performing 
tasks.  
●  “Pure Behavioral biometrics”: Metrics that revolve around strategies, skills, and 
knowledge shown during the performance of mentally demanding tasks, with no body 
measurements involved 
 
The authors developed a generalized algorithm for these different behaviors, which follows as: 
1. Pick a user behavior.  
2. Break-up the behavior into component actions.  
3. Determine the frequencies of component actions for each user.  
4. Combine results into a feature vector profile.  
5. Apply similarity measure function to compare the stored template with current behavior. 
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6. Experimentally determine a threshold value within which the user is authenticated. 
7. Verify or reject the user based on the similarity score comparison to the threshold value.  
 
The authors suggest that comparison and analysis of each feature follow guidelines of 
universality, uniqueness among individuals, the ability to adjust user behavior of time, and the 
ease of collectability. Furthermore, they made note that only some behavioral biometrics are 
dependable enough to be usable for any level of identification. In one case, the scores for a 
standardized test, such as IQ test, SAT, GRE, or GMAT, are not enough to identify an individual, 
because of a lack in uniqueness of the scores, but they could have been combined with other 
biometrics to improve accuracy. By transitioning these individual studies into a generalized 
approach, new behaviors proved much easier to be analyzed, tested for viability, and 
incorporated in our system. In all, these concepts helped us better research behaviors before we 
tested them, along with helping us disregard behaviors that are not particularly helpful with 
authentication.  
 
3.3 Deep Neural Nets for Modeling Mobile Soft Keystroke Authentication 
 
Deng and Zhong present a deep learning approach for mobile keystroke dynamics 
biometrics, as well as exploring the additional sensory data (touch screen, accelerometer, and 
gyroscope) available on smartphones for augmented keystroke biometrics. After describing 
previous works in the area, the authors suggested using Deep Neural Network (DNN) modeling 
on mobile soft keystroke authentication. The authors used the timing (duration of touch), taping 
(size of touch area), and inertial sensor (accelerometer) features, combined with the Stanford 
TapDynamics mobile keystroke dataset to train their DNN. The dataset included key tap, latency, 
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and accelerometer data from 55 subjects typing a pin number into a phone, yielding a total of 
1704 data samples recorded and 35 generated features. The authors performed layer-wise 
unsupervised training with the data to pre-train a Restricted Boltzmann Machine, a network with 
a visible and a hidden layer. Afterwards, they tuned the neural network with stochastic gradient 
training; the system had a False Acceptance Rate (FAR) of 4.4% and a False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
of 5.3% when no features were removed, an 11.7% FAR and a 12.6% FRR with just accelerometer 
statistics, a 17.8% FAR and 14.7% FRR with just key tap sizes, and a 28.4% FAR and 17.4% FRR 
with just key tap duration. These FARs and FRRs showcase Neural Networks effectively used to 
analyze behavioral data that then authenticates users. Although there exists a lack of research 
in Neural Networks implemented as a method of analyzing data, this study demonstrates Neural 
Networks’ potential in classifying data, further justifying our decision for using them to model 
user behavioral data. 
 
3.4 Touchalytics 
 
Frank et al.[2] obtained high accuracy authentication by classifying 30 touch data 
features, listed in Figure 4. Participants went through an “enrollment phase” (modeling phase), 
during which horizontal and vertical swipes were tracked. For the purpose of obtaining natural 
test results, participants were asked to read three documents and answer comprehension 
questions on a custom app that logged touches [2]. The unique touches of eight different users 
that were logged during this study can be seen in Figure 3. The authors propose a classification 
framework using k-nearest neighbors algorithm and Support Vector Machines to learn user 
behavior. During the continuous authentication phase, the participant must re-authenticate 
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after a certain number of consecutive negative classification results. In our implementation, we 
used a similar enrollment phase to train our model, followed by a continuous authentication 
phase to test it. An “informative” value was calculated for each of the 30 touch features in the 
Touchalytics research to rank each in terms of its ability to identify the user, as seen in Figure 4. 
The ranking gives us an approach for appropriately weighting these touch features during our 
initial implementations where we use a static metric ranking. After the model is trained, we 
expect the dynamic weights, obtained through training our Neural Network, to generally reflect 
this data. 
 
Figure 3. Smartphone strokes recorded for eight different users, showing unique user touch behavior 
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Figure 4. Features’ effectiveness to identify an individual. 
3.5 Soft Authentication with Low-Cost Signatures 
 Buthpitiya et al.[36] analyzes data from multiple (low accuracy) sensors to create an 
accurate authentication system. Their approach uses low-power cost strategies, such as reading 
logs that are already updated during routine usage. Utilizing these very practical measurements, 
the behavioral metrics analyzed included message response patterns, calling patterns, outdoor 
mobility patterns, and indoor mobility patterns. Compared to other research on behavioral 
security in smartphones, this paper focuses heavily on the phone uses, such as calls and text 
messages, addressing the original uses of the smartphone. These aspects prove important 
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considering their uniqueness to smartphone use rather than tablets or other computers that 
cannot make or receive calls. This article investigates a variety of feature and extraction 
modeling approaches; of particular interest are the n-gram model and Hamming distance models 
for GSM and Wi-Fi signal strength, respectively. We will likely implement similar strategies for 
analyzing user location. The Hamming distance is important in that it can quantify a distance 
between a set of non-numerical labels, which can be used to compare lists of Wi-Fi networks, 
Bluetooth devices, used apps, or locations. Overall, the n-gram model can be used to find 
sequential patterns across data points, as opposed to patterns within a data point [37]. 
 
3.6 Continuous Authentication on Mobile Devices Using Power 
Consumption, Touch Gestures and Physical Movement of Users 
Murmuria et al. presented an approach of authenticating users through a combination of 
touch gestures, power consumption, and physical movement, while also taking into account 
application context when modeling user behavior [38].  They collected data from 73 regular and 
irregular smartphone users in a room using Google Chrome and Facebook on a Nexus 5 Android 
phone. The phone logged power consumption; the touch area, pressure, and coordinates of finger 
touches; the number of fingers touching the screen; and short-term physical movements, such 
as hand vibrations. The authors noted that noise was a significant factor in the data, even though 
their subjects were in a highly controlled environment. However, they were able to authenticate 
users with a 93% accuracy after collecting data by additionally modeling the present noise. The 
authors believe that their approach is more viable as a real-world solution than other competing 
approaches in literature. Specifically, it can be scaled to a more realistic scenario, since noise is 
33 
 
already accounted for and a mobile device could be used over multiple days by volunteers 
performing daily routine tasks. We need to ensure that we test our metrics in both controlled and 
uncontrolled environments-- the point of behavioral authentication is to use personal 
uniqueness to identify and authenticate people, and using neural networks, we can create models 
that fit individuals.  
3.7 Authentication Feature and Model Selection using Penalty Algorithms 
Another small study conducted by Murmuria and Angelos [39] suggests that the best 
authentication features for finger swipes include: 
●  Arc-length of gesture  
●  Direction between endpoints 
●  Average finger diameter during gesture  
●  Average pressure during gesture  
●  Average finger speed during gesture   
They also suggest that the best authentication features for taps include duration of gesture, 
direction between end-points, average finger diameter during gesture. The authors collected 
WhatsApp data from 110 users’ datasets, with each user having at least 350 swipes and 350 taps 
each. 40 of the users had over 2 hours of usage logged on the application. They used the sum of 
Euclidean distances to an observation’s k-nearest neighbors to get a measure of uniqueness. We 
can use these findings into our system when we try to incorporate touch gestures into our 
application. 
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3.8 Miscellaneous 
 Ballard et al. [40] discusses the impracticality of testing behavioral security tests in “lab” 
conditions as many other researchers have done. The paper shows that security methods are 
much weaker than they appear when they are tested against “trained” forgers. The participants 
gave handwriting samples and then submitted forgeries of other participants’ samples. The best 
9 out of 55, the “natural” forgers, were allowed two hours of training to practice forging 
handwriting samples. The equal error rates were found to be exaggerated by 375% if the “trained” 
forgers’ analysis was used instead of the naive analysis. The forgers’ improvement was graphed 
over time, showing that training had a significant effect on successful forging, even for the 
“natural” forgers selected. Additionally, artificial intelligence was used to learn from 
handwriting samples and attempt to bypass the security. In order to improve the robustness of 
our authentication method, we will also have participants attempt to break our security. We will 
have some participants attempt to emulate other participants and see if they are able to break 
our security measures.  An individual’s model will be trained with both his/her training data and 
against the training data of others. In addition, the model will be tested by having participants 
attempt to imitate the behavior of other participants.  
3.9 Summary 
We devised a list of requirements for a behavioral model system by analyzing the papers 
that we have reviewed. These include: 
1. Accuracy 
2. Power efficiency 
3. Ease of implementation 
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Many of these studies utilized different combinations of metrics. Several of these used the inbuilt 
GPS, touch screen, and phone orientation with varying degrees of success. A basic requirement 
of our study is choosing metrics that have been proven to be somewhat effective for 
authentication by other papers, such as GPS, and pairing them with others that are not as proven, 
such as app usage. App usage falls under the category of a low accuracy power efficient sensor, 
which provide a better overall picture of phone usage in addition to the more accurate sensors. 
Touch is one biometric that is a unique enough identifier on its own, and would be included if 
not for the difficult implementation. Overall, a good behavioral authentication system depends 
on carefully selecting a combination of behavioral metrics that work together to build a suitable 
representation of one’s behavior. 
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4. Methodology 
         To be able to authenticate a user based on their behavior alone is a challenging task, and 
more so distinguishing individuals who exhibit similar behaviors based on the metrics we used. 
To understand the data that phones accumulate, we used four metrics we found to be effective 
at authenticating users, as suggested in previous and related works.  
4.1 Pilot Study 
We chose to test our system by having 4 senior WPI computer science students install our 
BMS data collection application and consent to having their phone statistics continuously 
monitored. They were asked to use their smartphones normally and sign into their Google 
Accounts to have their phones automatically upload their data. They were then asked to share 
their data folder with our BMS Google Account. Upon having test users collect data sorted by 
time of day, date, and device, we eventually had the data accumulated across multiple devices 
and added to a database on a personal development server of ours. We fed the data we collected 
into a neural network and had the system learn what is acceptable behavior independently and 
created models of test subject’s behaviors. We then tested the test subject’s data against each 
other’s models to check the strength of the models. 
4.2 Assumptions 
We made the following assumptions during the testing period: 
1. The user's behavior will not be affected by the use of our application.  
2. Each user's smartphone will be used only by the user and no one else.  
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3. Conversely, each user will use only one smartphone.  
4. Subjects are relatively distinguishable.  
5. The user's everyday and weekly routines do not change significantly during the app's use. 
4.3 Metrics Selected for Inclusion in BMS 
         We implemented our implicit authentication by selecting four behavioral metrics we 
found to be most promising from our literature review in identifying a user uniquely. In our 
research, we reasoned that it was most important to be able to try unique and distinct sets of 
behaviors especially in the beginning of our development, so we could cover a large subset of the 
meaningful data collected by the phone as used for authentication. The four metrics we chose 
were app usage data, precise GPS location, Wi-Fi signal strength, and tilt/angle from the 
accelerometer. These metrics are discussed in detail below. 
4.3.1 Smartphone App Usage Events 
         App usage events are events that log how a user interacts with their phone throughout 
the timeline of their daily activities, by logging when apps are moved to the foreground (actively 
open and used) and background (minimized) on their device. App usage proves a promising 
metric with the nature this data in relation to the behavior of the user [41]. Like how screen 
captures on a desktop computer allow an observer to see actions being undertaken by users, 
understanding what apps are being used at any given point in time enabled us to develop a 
behavioral model towards their app usage. By monitoring the times of day that particular apps 
are used, we understood when a user typically finds this app useful, and if there are daily, weekly, 
monthly, or other patterns to this app’s usage. Inserting the concepts of app usage frequency, or 
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how many times the app is opened over a day or other timespan, and app usage duration, or how 
long the app remains in the foreground per each usage event, we began to develop a timeline of 
user interactions with their phone. This intuitive and natural formation of a model of how the 
phone is used on different timescales was made easier by the approachable nature of the APIs 
that gather this data already for us, but do nothing with it. Fridman et al included app name and 
frequency in their active authentication system and found that across three different time 
windows of 1 minute, 10 minutes, and 30 minutes, app usage was the least predictable 
contributor overall compared to text, web, and location [42]. However, for the smaller windows 
the contribution of app usage was higher, which can be explained by the first app opened in a 
window being a consistent behavior [42]. By amassing this data into timelines across varying 
scales of how the person usually behaves in regards to their phone, we gave the phone a basis for 
what behavior is to be expected out of it on a normal day. Furthermore, more precise metrics can 
be observed through app usage, including battery drain from an app over a frame of time 
(someone using the Facebook app scrolling through their news feed would typically use a lot less 
power than someone who frequently watches videos on the app, for example), along with app 
transitions to form a path which users tend to follow between apps. 
4.3.2 Precise Location 
        The location metric includes the longitude and latitude values from the GPS. To better 
provide a state to the model, we found it imperative for states we measured to have an associated 
location, or a precise latitude and longitude measured by GPS. With location already used in 
Google’s ‘Trusted Locations’ for authenticating Android devices when they are within the range 
of a location specified, we realized that it was an invaluable metric to couple with others to give 
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us a larger picture of the state of the user [43]. Recognizing that we could tether location to app 
usage metrics, we understood not only when a user interacts with a device and with what app, 
but also where the user is at the same time. Upon these more complete associations, we used 
pattern-based location history as a metric to map users’ behavior against, to see if they returned 
to locations they visited previously, giving us more points of comparison for behavior of the user. 
Location, and precise location at that, allowed us to gain a completely new level of precision for 
combinatorial behavior, or the combinations of all the differing behaviors that we measured; it 
added millions of potential points for users to be located at that are unique to them, or unique 
in combination with other metrics the phone observed. Additionally, with location behavior 
being incredibly personal, we were explicitly clear with how we handled the data we gathered, 
how it was stored, and how long it was used for app authentication purposes. 
4.3.3 Wi-Fi Access Points Observed 
 Wi-Fi provides smartphones with internet access at home and on the go wirelessly. The 
list of Wi-Fi Access Points (APs) a user observes per every collection cycle offer a deeper layer of 
context for the user’s location and travel path, which precise location cannot provide. In a 
common scenario where many people are all living in the same location they will all show similar 
behaviors. Using signal strengths to approximate distances from access points, the Wi-Fi APs 
around a user provide a finer level of detail that can provide the position of a user within a 
building. Wi-Fi Information is already gathered by the phone periodically. As a result, our 
system’s usage of this metric is opportunistic and the power cost of this metric is thus minimal. 
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4.3.4 Tilt Data 
         Finally, to complement the other three metrics, we associated accelerometer and 
magnetometer data to instantaneously calculate the three-dimensional tilt of the phone. Since 
tilt can associate how the user interacts with their phones, we could see the orientation of the 
phone while using different applications, at different locations or in different states, such as 
surfing web pages, browsing photos, typing, and much more. People habitually interact with their 
phones in ways that are comfortable to them, and tilt gave us an idea of how the user holds their 
phone across different apps. 
 
4.4 Gathering the Data 
 We found our application for data gathering to be best logically structured as a stream, or 
a timeline of data gathered across the day. The flow of data is shown in Figure. 5 below. Each 
sensor is scheduled to record data at regular intervals. When data is pulled from a sensor, our 
Behavioral Model System application saves the recent sensor activity and a timestamp to a file 
on the device. Then file is uploaded regularly to a server for deep learning processing. Finally, 
the server will send a message back to the phone showing the authentication status.  
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Figure 5. Feeding into the ANN for an authentication output 
4.5 Privacy Concerns 
 Because we are collecting and analyzing user data, we needed to address privacy concerns 
with user identity and tracking their behaviors. We chose to address this problem in two ways. 
We used anonymization techniques in both the way we stored files on our server and in the way 
that we structured the user data. The files for each individual user used the same formatting and 
contained no identifying marks that pertain to name and phone number of the user. We also 
allowed users to disable metrics that they did not want to be used for authentication purposes. 
4.6 Authentication 
The user was authenticated or unauthenticated based on a trust score. A trust score 
represents the likelihood of the user matching their trusted model from a range of zero 
(untrusted) to one (trusted). As a trust score gets closer to one, the significance of a single trust 
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score being higher than another trust score decreases. If the trust score was below a certain 
threshold, the user would be de-authenticated. The threshold for de-authentication was 
determined experimentally. In considering trust, the cutoffs cannot be so strict that the user is 
often and inconveniently de-authenticated or so lenient that significant damage may be done 
before an imposter is unauthenticated. Through the accumulation of more data however, the 
user’s trust score became more accurate over time, while remaining dynamic and consistent for 
only one particular user’s threshold range.  
 We used a feedforward neural network with several input nodes for each sensor and input 
nodes for the timestamp at which the data point was recorded. For data such as app usage 
metrics, which has a potentially infinite list of used apps, we processed each one of the apps 
independently. There was one output node, producing the trust score. The number of hidden 
layers were determined experimentally. In order for the authentication to be continuous and 
convenient, as we intended, it had to: 1) adjust to new changes in the person’s routine 2) 
authenticate accurately 3) weight features effectively and 4) be practical for a diverse group of 
users.  
The neural network constantly evolved as its training data changed. This was done with 
incremental learning, training the neural network with just one input at a time. After each 
training session of size one, the neural network updated its weights and biases in a direction that 
best accommodated the one data point. Furthermore, the learning rate parameter was adjusted 
to modify how sensitive the neural network is to change. 
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 5. BMS System Implementation 
 
 There were several important considerations we followed for our implementation of the 
Behavioral Model System, or BMS. Accuracy was one of those considerations because a user 
needs to be authenticated and unauthenticated correctly for the system to work. Aside from 
accuracy, another significant consideration for this project was extensibility- we made it possible 
to add and remove a near indefinite number of metrics at any given time, and have our program 
adapt.  
Figure 6 shows the overall design of our system. Sensors on the phone are tracked through 
our Behavioral Model System App. The sensor data is saved as a JSON file using a JSON saving 
Daemon and then uploaded to Google Drive cloud storage. The cloud storage moves the data to 
a cloud infrastructure which processes the data using a neural network and produces an 
authentication result. The result is sent back to Google Drive and then to our app's 
authentication service. 
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Figure 6. BMS design. 
5.1 Implementing Our Authentication Modality 
The implementation of our metrics used several Android APIs specific to the type and 
amount of data needed for each metric. As we wanted to focus on our application being optimized 
for more modern devices, striking a balance of widespread availability, usage, and recency, we 
developed on Android 6.0, Marshmallow, API Level 23. All of our metrics used APIs with practical 
approaches on this version of the platform, as seen in Table 8.  
Metric Android API Description 
App Usage Events App Usage 
Statistics API 
Retrieves statistics about the apps used on the device  
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Location Awareness API Efficiently tracks multiple sensors as a way of getting the 
user’s context 
Tilt SensorManager 
Position 
Sensors 
Access the sensors on a device such as the accelerometer 
Wi-Fi Wi-FiManager Shows the Wi-Fi configuration of the device as well as the 
nearby wireless access points 
Table 8. The sensors we are tracking and the API's used to do it. 
5.2 Implementing Data Collection as a Background Process 
These APIs shown in table 8 were used for collecting data in the background and storing 
it for use in our neural network. To achieve our low power goal, we collected data using Android’s 
AlarmManager, a class in Android used for scheduling an application to be run, and used a remote 
server to train and create our Neural Networks. 
5.2.1 Background Services 
 Our application is made up of several background services, each containing the API calls 
for fetching the location, app usage events, tilt, and touch of the device. We used Android’s 
AlarmManager, to continuously collect data from the user on a short-interval basis. For the 
purpose of data collection in the background, using the AlarmManager fit our use case the best 
because of its ability to run in intervals even without the app open. It is also much less resource 
intensive compared to the alternative of a continuously running background service. 
Android’s AlarmManager class is used in our program through a repeating alarm for each 
metric that will run the data collection when the alarm goes off after a certain interval of time. 
In our implementation alarms were set to fire every five minutes. Unfortunately, Android 6.0 
only allows “inexact” alarms, which means that Android will attempt to run multiple alarms at 
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the same time, potentially causing an alarm to run up to an entire cycle (the time it takes for the 
alarm to go off) late. This has not impacted our data collection; however it needs to be mentioned 
because data collection periods are roughly five minutes apart instead of exactly five minutes. 
5.2.2 Data Storage 
 
Metric Data Being Collected Sample Values 
App Usage 
Events 
Name of app 
Timestamp 
Com.android.chrome 
22-04-2017 06:21:15 
Tilt X axis 
Y axis 
Z axis 
Timestamp 
5 
-5 
0 
22-04-2017 06:21:15 
Location Latitude 
Longitude 
Timestamp 
-8.93530 
-50.44254 
22-04-2017 06:21:15 
Wi-Fi SSID (Name of Network) 
Mac address (ID of Network) 
Signal strength 
Timestamp 
WPI Wireless 
B9-1A-39-59-A5-9A 
-39 
22-04-2017 06:21:15 
Table 9. Summary of data gathered from our selected behavioral metrics. 
We stored the results, time-stamped, locally on the device, as a form of a timeline of 
events. The data was stored in a JSON format as it was easily created locally and parsed by the 
server.  
5.2.3 Collecting Data 
The JSON files were uploaded from the phone to the user's Google Drive account. The 
data folder was shared to a BMS Google Drive account. To prevent synchronization problems and 
communications problems that may occur between our mobile clients and the server, we used 
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Google Drive as an intermediary to store client data and server authentication / unauthentication 
messages. This eliminated many problems that would occur and not undermine the underlying 
implicit behavioral authentication concept of our project. Google provides both android and 
python APIs for the Drive Service so this made this sort of communication relatively easy to 
design. 
The Google Drive API runs as a background service on the phone. There were two mobile 
portions to the Google Drive API and two server portions to Google Drive API, both sets have an 
information sending portion and an information retrieving portion. 
In the mobile application, the sending portion recorded the mobile phone’s IMEI number 
and used it to create a folder on Google Drive. The phone then periodically uploaded collected 
information to this folder in the form of JSON files. This information was parsed by the server 
and fed into corresponding neural networks. We believe that the phone’s IMEI number can be 
used to distinguish different users as we assume that there will only be one user per mobile 
phone. The mobile application also initially creates an authentication file in which the server 
periodically updates based on whether a user is authenticated or not. The authentication service 
on the phone periodically checks the file for the authentication status of the device and notifies 
the user whether they have been authenticated or unauthenticated. In our implementation, we 
found that we had to query Google Drive twice in order to properly read updates from the 
authentication file. We do not believe this is an issue that needs to be addressed at this stage of 
implementation. 
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5.2.4 TensorFlow Server 
Our server ran Python 2.7 code using the TensorFlow 1.0 APIs. We used a fully connected, 
feed forward neural network with 2 hidden layers, with 8 nodes each for the sake of simplicity. 
We used the sigmoid activation function, which outputs values which range between 0 and 1. If 
the network produced values close to 1 it meant that the input values in the testing set match 
closely to the model.  
There are a few drawbacks with this implementation. TensorFlow 1.0 APIs abstract away 
many functionalities that needed to be manually tuned in previous versions. One of these 
abstractions caused our network to save “event files” automatically in the model folder after each 
training session of the model. A new event file is saved after every training session. Furthermore, 
the information in one events file is created by appending a small amount of data to the previous 
events file and saving it again. When running a numerous amount of training sessions, the files 
started to grow to incredibly large sizes making our server run out of disk space. The space 
problem was patched by deleting the events files every 10 training sessions.  
5.2.5 Data Representation 
The input of the neural network consists of one node for each number feature, such as 
tiltX,tiltY,tiltZ, latitude, longitude, and others. Conversely, the strings were represented as 
several nodes rather than a single node in order to make it easier for the neural network to 
understand the input, such as individual app names and Wi-Fi BSSIDs. Since we did not want two 
strings with similar structure and different semantic meaning to be represented as two very close 
numbers, the conversion from one string to n nodes was completed by converting the string to a 
large number and then taking the last n bits of the number. Shown below in Table 10 are a list of 
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all metrics implemented and the features we extracted from them. The general features of hour 
and minute of the time are extracted from every metric. 
Metric Extracted Features 
Tilt Specific TiltX (float) 
TiltY (float) 
TiltZ (float) 
Location Specific Longitude (float) 
Latitude (float) 
Wi-Fi Specific Wi-Fi name (string) 
Wi-Fi bssid (string) 
Wi-Fi signal strength (float) 
App Usage Events Specific App name (string) 
Foreground/background status (int) 
All Hour (int)  
Minute (int) 
Table 10. Metrics implemented by BMS and Features extracted from them 
 
On initialization, the network is registered with a hashmap of feature-value pairs, which 
contains values for all the features that will be extracted. These values are all initialized to zero. 
The network takes one JSON file. In the file, each sensor object is processed and alters certain 
values in the hashmap. For example, if the first object is a tilt object, the tiltX, tiltY, tiltZ, hour, 
and minute values in the feature list are altered and the other values stay the same (as zeroes). 
This process assumes that when a sensor object is read in, the other sensor objects have not 
changed. Then, each value in the hashmap is fed into the neural network. These steps are 
repeated: read sensor object, update feature list, feed to network, all until the JSON file is fully 
input.  
For the neural network’s desired output, we used a 1 to indicate true data and a 0 to 
indicate false data. For example, subject A’s model was trained positively with subject A’s data 
using a desired output of 1, and it was trained negatively with subject B, C, and D’s data using a 
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desired output of 0. As a result, it learned to output a trust score (float value) which is close to 1 
if the given data is more similar to subject A’s data and close to 0 if the given data is more similar 
to subject B, C, or D’s data.  
After the training session is finished, the model is saved automatically in TensorFlow 
1.0's regressor.fit function. It is saved in a folder during training. After the training is done, the 
folder is compressed and unused until needed.  
 Through the implementation, the JSON files are read from the user’s Google Drive, 
corrupted ones are removed, the model is loaded and finally trained and used for prediction based 
on the continuous JSON data. This process will eventually be refined, potentially in future work, 
but we intend for the process to be completely automated through a more finalized release of 
BMS. 
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6 Results 
We decided that we would need to test both our systems effectiveness in authentication 
and the systems’ impact on phone battery life. We used the JSON files uploaded by the test 
phones and separated into a training and testing set in order to evaluate the neural networks, 
and we used an app called GSam Battery Monitor[44] to collect metrics about the battery life of 
test phones running the BMS application and not running the BMS application in both sitting 
and moving scenarios. 
6.1 Discussion of Behavior of Users Surveyed 
 To understand some of the results, we first needed to explain some of the nuances in our 
collection of data. We used 4 test subjects for data collection, subject A, subject B, subject C, and 
subject D. All subjects were undergraduate senior computer science students attending 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute.  
o Subjects A, B and C live in the same apartment and go out for dinner together 
almost daily. Subjects A, B and C live in the same apartment and go out for dinner 
together almost daily.  
o Subjects B and C have adjacent rooms and their workspaces are within a few feet 
of one another.  
o Subject D often visits the apartment of subject A, B and C and often is in the rooms 
of subjects A and C.  
o Subjects A and B share a 1-hour class together in which they also meet for group 
projects 
o Subjects C and D share a 2-hour class together 
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o Although this should not be a problem, subjects C and D share the same phone 
model which may play a factor that we are not aware of.  
6.2 Battery Tests 
The GSam Battery Monitor app was used to monitor battery drain on an Android phone 
with and without the BMS app running. This collected the percentage of the battery used by each 
app and the rate of change of the battery. A Nexus 6 smartphone, running Android 7.1.1 Nougat, 
was left in the same location for 4 hours. The only apps installed on the Nexus 6 other than the 
stock apps were the GSam Battery Monitor and the BMS app. App usage events, Wi-Fi, location, 
and tilt data were pulled at intervals of 60 seconds, 60 seconds, 60 seconds, and 30 seconds, 
respectively. The difference in battery drain are shown below in Table 11. With BMS running, the 
smartphone only used an additional 2% of battery life in 4 hours. 
Further testing is required to determine if the results are accurate to real-world scenarios. 
Since the phone remained stationary and unused during the testing period, the phone would 
have recorded less data in terms of app usage. As a result, the stored JSON files would have been 
smaller and required less battery to write and upload. In addition, some smartphone sensors may 
go into a “sleep” mode when the phone is not active. If this were the case, BMS would drain 
battery faster than expected from the battery test. 
 
 With BMS Without BMS 
Battery Drain 10% 8% 
Table 11. Battery drain with and without the BMS app. 
6.3 Authentication Results 
Data for four subjects was collected over a period of approximately 11 days. For each 
subject, his neural network model was tested on day x after being positively trained to output 1 
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on his data and negatively trained to output 0 on all other subjects’ data on all days before day x. 
For example, a model for subject A’s 5th day could be trained on subject A’s data positively and 
subject B, C, and D’s data negatively for all data up to that day, days 1 through 4. Predictions are 
then made for the 5th day. For each subject, subject A’s model will take that subject’s data and 
output a predicted trust score. This score should be close to 1 for subject A’s data and close to 0 
for subject B, C, and D’s data. Subsequently, the 5th day, if trusted, is added to the model as 
additional training. At this point, the neural network model has incorporated training from days 
1 through 5. The process is repeated to make predictions for the 6th day, and so forth. This reflects 
real-world conditions, where the network continually receives new data to train on and must give 
a predicted authentication score for the current day.  
Features from all metrics: Wi-Fi, location, tilt, and app usage events, were used in 
training. For the specific features extracted from each metric, please see Table 10. Below (Figures 
7 – 10) are graphs of subject A, B, C, and D’s models, respectively. The predictions for each 
subject on each day are graphed. Each line represents a single subject’s predicted trust score and 
shows how it changed after each day. 
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Figure 7. Subject A’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject A’s data and 0 when given subject B, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of all metrics: tilt, Wi-Fi, location, and app usage data. The predicted trust score 
is plotted for each subject on each day. 
 
Figure 8. Subject B’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject B’s data and 0 when given subject A, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of all metrics: tilt, Wi-Fi, location, and app usage data. The predicted trust score 
for all subject’s data on each day was plotted. 
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Figure 9. Subject C’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject C’s data and 0 when given subject A, B, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of all metrics: tilt, Wi-Fi, location, and app usage data. The predicted trust score 
for all subject’s data on each day was plotted. 
 
Figure 10. Subject D’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject D’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or C’s data. Training data consisted of all metrics: tilt, Wi-Fi, location, and app usage data. The predicted trust 
score for all subject’s data on each day was plotted. 
In each person’s graph, they all followed generally the same trend with user behavior, 
within a few hundredths of fitting to one another’s user behavior. Only in case C did any single 
user’s behavior fit their own behavior better than other people fit their own behavior. Despite 
the users leading very different behaviors and lives, especially with app usage behavior. Below, 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Tr
u
st
 S
co
re
All Metrics on Subject C's Model
A B C D
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Tr
u
st
 S
co
re
Axis Title
Model D Trained With all Metrics and Tested on 
all Subjects' Data Over all Days
A B C D
56 
 
Table 12. Day 11 Confusion Matrix shows a better breakdown of the authentication values on the 
last day (day 11) of testing. 
 
   Model   
Te
st
in
g  A B C D 
A 0.696176851 0.72920086 0.790976558 0.718816646 
B 0.689681277 0.749293778 0.749973414 0.72049831 
C 0.724192657 0.756450769 0.92878729 0.722945101 
D 0.729186394 0.756887059 0.927878674 0.721123157 
Table 12. Day 11 Confusion Matrix of training on all metrics. 
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After training on days 1 through 10, the network gave mixed results when tested on day 
11. Of the four models, model C (Table 12, 3rd column) performed the best, giving its subject 
(subject C) the highest trust score, 0.9287. It is important to note that this score exceeded the 
second highest score, 0.9278, by a difference of only 0.0009. With such a small margin, model C 
was not able to differentiate data from subjects C and D.  
Models A, B and D were unable to assign their subject the highest trust score. Model A 
(Table 12, 1st column) gave subject A the third highest trust score of 0.6961, noticeably lower 
than 0.7241 and 0.7291, the scores given to subjects C and D, respectively. Model B (Table 12, 2st 
column) gave subject B the third highest trust score of 0.7492, slightly lower than 0.7564 and 
0.7568, the scores given to subjects C and D respectively. Finally, model D (Table 12, 4th column) 
gave subject D the second highest trust score, only slight lower than 0.7229, the score given to 
subject C. It was disappointing to find that using all metrics and 10 days of training data, models 
A, B, and D did not each correctly score their own subject as the most likely to be authenticated.  
6.3.1 Accuracy 
In subject A's model (Figure 7), the network produced very similar trust scores for all 
subjects at nearly every day, but there was more deviation in the trust scores near the end of the 
testing period. While we expected the network to differentiate more as more training data was 
made available, subject A's model was still unable to give subject A's testing data the highest 
trust score near the end of the training period. The results for subject B (Figure 8) and subject D's 
(Figure 10) models are similar, with the network unable to give its user the highest trust score 
and give other subjects a lower trust score. 
Subject C's neural network model (Figure 9) was the most successful in differentiating 
between the subjects and predicting the highest trust score for subject C. The scores across 
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different subjects generally deviated more as more training was available, showing that the 
network was able to differentiate the behavior between the four subjects. However, the model 
gave subject D almost exactly the same trust score on several days. Depending on the 
authentication score threshold we set, the model could have authenticated subject D using 
subject C's smartphone. 
6.3.2 Patterns 
For all models (Figures 7 - 10), the trust scores on subjects C and D are very similar. 
Furthermore, the score of model C on D is very close to the score of model C on C, and the score 
of model D on C is very close to the score of model D on D. We can infer that subjects C and D are 
very similar, as measured with the network's trust score. This was expected, since subjects C and 
D share a two hour class twice a week, and subject C occasionally works in subject D's room. The 
location and Wi-Fi networks would have been similar for both subjects during these times. 
In addition, the trust scores on subjects A and B are similar for all models. This was 
expected because they share a one-hour class and meet for project work for several hours at a 
time. Also, they use similar apps, including Messenger and Telegram. Therefore, in many ways it 
is consistent that their evaluations across each other’s models are similar. 
6.3.3 Comparison with Users’ App Usage Statistics 
 
The below table shows the most commonly used applications used by each subject.  
There are a few commonalities between each subject and their most used applications, but 
there are also many differences. We can qualitatively see that there are differences between 
each user, but they are not reflected in the models shown in the next sections. 
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Subject 5 Most Frequently Used Applications 
Subject A 1. Manga Mobile 
2. Google Chrome 
3. Facebook 
4. Telegram 
5. YouTube 
Subject B 1. Reddit 
2. Google Chrome 
3. Facebook 
4. Telegram 
5. Music 
Subject C 1. Textra 
2. Google Chrome 
3. Tinder 
4. Reddit 
5. Telegram 
Subject D 1. Duel Links 
2. Google Chrome 
3. Quora 
4. Photos 
5. Facebook 
Table 13. List of most commonly used applications by Subject 
6.4 Individual Metrics 
Data for the four subjects was compiled in the same way in consecutive designs of the 
model. Tracking individual metrics at a time, we systematically tested each metric on each user. 
For the specific features extracted from each metric, please see Table 10. Further, a subject’s 
model was negatively trained on behavior against the other subjects’ three models, training those 
behaviors to not be considered valid since it is not from that user. The charts below show the 
results of testing all subjects' models, using the individual metrics of app usage (Figures 11-14), 
location (Figures 15-18) and Wi-Fi (Figures 19-22), and using training data from all subjects. 
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Figure 11. Subject A’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject A’s data and 0 when given subject B, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only app usage data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each 
day was plotted. 
 
Figure 12. Subject B’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject B’s data and 0 when given subject A, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only app usage data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each 
day was plotted. 
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Figure 13. Subject C’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject C’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or D’s data. Training data consisted of only app usage data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each 
day was plotted. 
 
 
Figure 14. Subject D’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject D’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or C’s data. Training data consisted of only app usage data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each 
day was plotted. 
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Figure 15. Subject A’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject A’s data and 0 when given subject B, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only location data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
 
Figure 16. Subject B’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject B’s data and 0 when given subject A, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only location data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
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Figure 17. Subject C’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject C’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or D’s data. Training data consisted of only location data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each 
day was plotted. 
 
Figure 18. Subject D’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject D’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, C’s data. Training data consisted of only location data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
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Figure 19. Subject A’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject A’s data and 0 when given subject B, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only Wi-Fi data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
 
Figure 20. Subject B’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject B’s data and 0 when given subject A, C, 
or D’s data. Training data consisted of only Wi-Fi data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
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Figure 21. Subject C’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject C’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or D’s data. Training data consisted of only Wi-Fi data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
 
Figure 22. Subject D’s neural network, trained to output 1 when given subject D’s data and 0 when given subject A, 
B, or C’s data. Training data consisted of only Wi-Fi data. The predicted trust score for all subject’s data on each day 
was plotted. 
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strongly. Subjects C and D’s results are consistently very much like one another, and they 
evaluate similarly on each other’s models as well, with similarities almost within a margin of 
error in similar behavior. Ideally, these would be more disparate, but their behavior are indeed 
incredibly comparable. 
6.4.2 Comparison of Individual Metrics against All Metrics 
Subjects A and B had similar models in all four of the model types: all metrics, only 
location, only Wi-Fi, and only app usage.  In this case, this would imply that location, Wi-Fi, and 
app usage were all in agreement, and all metrics are equally inaccurate in identifying these two 
test subjects.  
Subject C’s model trained using all metrics performed better and differentiated users 
better than models trained with only one metric. In this case, the use of all metrics together was 
more effective than any individual metric. Since a trust score can also be obtained by summing 
scores from multiple independent sources, it was encouraging to find that the neural network 
was able to find correlations between different metrics.  
For subject D, the model trained using only app usage performed better and differentiated 
users better than models trained with only Wi-Fi, only location, and all metrics. As a result, app 
usage is a strong predictive factor of correct authentication for subject A. It is unusual that the 
network performed better with less data available. It is possible that the other less predictive 
metrics, Wi-Fi and location, caused the model with all metrics to "average out" to a worse 
accuracy.  
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6.5 Discussion of Results 
 Our results overall, compared to what we were hoping for and expecting, have been 
underwhelming. There are many reasons we rationalize these results, and see them as helpful to 
future implementations based off this design and implementation. 
6.5.1 Difficulties with Artificial Intelligence 
 Our resources in implementing our AI were heavily limited, as our efforts were split 
among app development, automation, research, and AI design. It is very possible that with our 
efforts so divided, we ended up overlooking an issue with inputting data to the network, or 
network design in general that would otherwise keep us from getting fitting results for all of our 
behaviors of the day. 
6.5.2 Similarities with Behavior 
 As discussed earlier in the chapter, many of the test subjects have incredibly similar 
behaviors and routines. All of them are in the same grade, work in the same places, the same 
classes and group projects, and attend the same college. Even some activities outside of school, 
such as meals, trips, and other minor behaviors were shared among us all, so to suggest that the 
network trusted all our behavior too much and tried to both positively and negatively fit to  
6.5.3 Improving our Network 
A day-of-week feature should be added to the neural network, to improve the notion of 
weekly routines. For example, a college student may have classes scheduled every Monday at 
noon or a person might have leave work early every Friday. If only the hour and minute values 
are used in the neural network, it would be trained to sometimes associate the classroom's 
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location with 12:00 pm on the days the student had class, contradicting the association on days 
without class. 
Additionally, a recurrent neural network (RNN) should be tested. In a RNN, the output is 
affected by previous inputs as well as the current input, dealing with sequential data more 
effectively. For instance, a daily routine could be leaving home, getting breakfast, and then going 
to work. The sequence of events is more meaningful than the exact times during which these 
events occurred.  
It is possible that the data given to the neural network is too specific. Instead of the x,y, 
and z orientations of the phone, labels such as "upright" or "lying flat" might be more effective. 
In place of an app's name, we could use an app category, such as "game", "music", or 
"photography". Similarly, a location could be represented as categories such as "restaurant”, 
“store", or "gas station". If a person went to a different restaurant every night, the network would 
differentiate between the longitude and latitude values but ignore the motivation behind visiting 
the location.  
6.5.4 Final Words 
Although our results are underwhelming we believe that a system like this could work. 
We cannot make a strong assertion to the viability of our system. We would need a more diverse 
set of test subjects and a more developed artificial intelligence to make any stronger claims.  
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7 Future Works 
To fully understand the project we have implemented, we offer our vision for the future 
of the project, and rationalize why such efforts are viable and the appropriate directions for this 
project to take.  
7.1 Modular Implementation Allowing User to Select Various Combinations 
of Metrics 
More than anything, the user must be able to trust the platform that they use to 
authenticate themselves to their electronic devices. Without designing each aspect of BMS to be 
toggleable, therefore disallowing the user complete control of what is being used to authenticate 
them, the user is likely to not feel comfortable giving the entirety of the model complete 
permissions; in short, the user needs to be able to choose the metrics they are comfortable in 
sharing with BMS. The only way this succeeds is in a modular design of the implementation of 
BMS. Naturally, going forward, we find the model to be usable in increasingly complex settings, 
with potentially more intrusive metrics, on both phone usage and battery life, so to add these 
metric modules, we would want the user to be able to shut them off as they deem necessary to 
get the model that they want. 
7.2 Negative Sample Models  
As this is a security application, implicitly authenticating the user, it is essential that we 
are accurate with authenticating our user on their phone and no other. In future 
implementations, we would gather the user data that already exists, and with the user's consent 
we would anonymize that data and add it to a repository of non-matches, based on a hashed user 
ID. That gathered data would later be introduced to other users' models, to see if any of the other 
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users' models would output an "authenticated" or significantly trusted score from the data that 
is not meant to authenticate those models. If this happens, the user will be notified that their 
model is not yet strong enough, and they have to keep building it in order for it to improve 
further. If this persists across several weeks, the app and server would later inform the user that 
their interactions with the phone are particularly hard to distinguish from others, and that it is 
recommended they add more metrics if available or use a secondary authentication method like 
a trusted device or explicit authentication method. This way, we can ensure the user is informed 
as to whether or not their model is particularly secure or unique, and that they should feel 
decently trusting of the technology.  
7.3 Multi-User Support on Shared Devices 
In rationalizing the idea of the neural network being able to distinguish between users 
and provide advice about using more metrics to uniquely identify the user, a more profound idea 
emerged. If our model is able to distinguish between several other users' data at once, it would 
be similarly feasible to set up two or more instances of BMS on a phone, one for each respective 
user. Every user would have a training phase, and at every point along the model creation phase, 
preferably through a fingerprint, data would be saved to the respective user. Once all instances 
of BMS are in place, a user could be recognized merely by interactions with the phone that it 
finds to be matching a particular user, locking out certain interactions, accounts and data 
tethered to other users on the phone.  
7.4 Distinguishing Group of Friends with Many Shared Behavioral Patterns.  
 This level of user granularity does not have to be tethered to just one device. In the 
exemplary case of two friends regularly going out to eat together, they could very easily link their 
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profiles in a future iteration of BMS to relate location data and potentially each other’s behavioral 
models for a time, so both of their phones will recognize when the friend is using it, or the shared 
behavior between both can be matched as an identifying metric for the model; the fact that you 
and your friend’s phones are in the same location for a time can be taken as positive input for 
the authentication metric. When friends are in a location where a user are expected to be 
according to a model, such metrics can also immediately de-authenticate the user’s phone.  
7.5 Multi-Device Connection and Internet of Things 
 Just as a phone and behavioral model can’t be expected to just handle one set of behaviors 
at any point, a behavioral model should expect the user to not contain all of their digital 
interactions to one device. Tie-ins to read from connected users accounts that could provide 
more data would be invaluable merely from the number of and time of interactions with that 
account. This technology has many use cases, outlined in examples below.  
7.5.1 Integrating Metrics Gathered from Home Assistants  
 Home Assistant Devices such as Google Home and Amazon Alexa that have been taking 
the consumer market by storm and growing significantly in popularity over the past few years. 
These devices allow users to augment their daily lives by allowing them to ask questions, play 
music, schedule events, etc. These devices, associated with certain user accounts, offer a wide 
variety of data and real-world interactions a user has with the device. These interactions are 
saved, and note the time of day, length of interaction, and the parsed query. With all of this very 
contextual, very precise vocal data gathered with these assistants, the data can be uploaded to 
the behavioral model as a metric, and verified based on the “Trusted Voice” Google uses for 
authentication on the mobile device.  
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7.5.2 Supporting Smartwatch Interactions 
A "Trusted Voice" works for many situations, but in many ways a much more personal 
interaction with the user is necessary. These personal monitoring devices can build off our 
behavioral model system through the addition of smartwatches, which can monitor a user's gate, 
heart rate, GPS, nearby Bluetooth and Wi-Fi devices (with specific attention to the phone's 
Bluetooth connection for proximity monitoring). Coupled with the data the phone can receive, a 
more complete model of the user’s behavior becomes available. 
7.5.3 Supporting Desktop Interactions 
 Integrations with other devices should not just end at the wrist or in the Google 
ecosystem. The integrations can extend to desktop interactions, and behavioral app statistics 
can be used to complement the data already gathered from phones to build a more complete 
model of user behavior.  
7.5.4 Supporting Other Mobile Devices 
 Not every user contains their mobile interactions to one device. Using an account-based 
timeline to tether multiple device interactions to the same person will give a more complete user 
picture, and authenticate different devices at different times based on user behavior.  
7.5.5 User Timeline 
 Ideally, these smaller concepts would be unified under a singular BMS account per 
individual, and would have a fairly complete timeline of all the interactions with the user. ￼ 
7.6 Evaluating Different Neural Networks 
 We used a feedforward network for our implementation because it was simple to 
implement and worked for finding patterns in data. However, feedforward networks do not have 
73 
 
a strong temporal component to them. We believe that testing networks with dynamic temporal 
behavior such as Recurrent Neural Networks, which deal better with one-dimensional adjacency, 
would better help with finding behaviors that occur in a certain order at approximate times of 
the day, such as going to get coffee and then going to work. 
8 Conclusions 
Explicit authentication methods are proving to be insufficient for the personal data 
stored on smartphones. We propose the Behavioral Model System (BMS), a continuous 
authentication system that uses deep learning to authenticate in a way that is accurate and 
constantly adjusting to the user’s routines. The BMS mobile application tracks the Wi-Fi, 
location, app usage, and tilt of the phone and uploads the information to Google Drive. The 
information is then pulled from Google Drive and fed into the TensorFlow Server to build models 
of each user’s behavior. Both the mobile application and TensorFlow Server are modular enough 
to add and remove metrics in the future. The BMS mobile application does not have a significant 
impact on phone battery life. The results on our TensorFlow server are a little underwhelming. 
This could be due to several factors such as the similarities between our test subjects and our 
inexperience with TensorFlow. Future work includes giving the user control of collected metrics, 
notifying the user if their model is inaccurate, multi-user authentication, and group behavior.   
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